The Super-Body Dilemma: Why Indonesia’s Police Model is a Global Anomaly
By: Tri Lukman Hakim, S.H. (Founder, KunciPro Research Institute)
The discourse on police reform in Indonesia has reignited with intensity. On February 4, 2026, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Kapolri), General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, explicitly rejected proposals to place the police force under a civilian ministry. Citing the mandate of the 1945 Constitution, he argued that the police must remain directly under the President to ensure "operational flexibility" and stability.
While General Sigit’s argument for a streamlined chain of command sounds pragmatic, a closer audit by KunciPro Research Institute reveals that this centralized model is a stark anomaly among modern democracies. When we benchmark Indonesia against global standards, the refusal to adopt a ministerial oversight model raises serious questions about checks and balances.
A "State Within a State"?
Indonesia’s Law No. 2 of 2002 creates a unique and powerful entity: a police force that answers to no one but the Head of State. The official narrative frames this as a necessary evolution from the Reformasi era to separate the police from the military (TNI). However, this separation has come at a cost.
By bypassing the Ministry of Home Affairs—a standard "buffer" in many democratic systems—the Indonesian police risk becoming a "Super-Body." In the lens of sociology of law, this direct subordination to the President blurs the line between law enforcement and political maneuvering. Without the filter of a civilian ministry, the police are vulnerable to becoming a tool for the executive branch to secure political stability rather than impartial justice.
Global Benchmarking: How Mature Democracies Manage Power
To understand why Indonesia's "flexibility" argument is flawed, we must look at how other major powers structure their internal security to prevent abuse of power.
Take France, for example. The French Police Nationale and Gendarmerie operate strictly under the Ministry of the Interior. This structure, codified in their Internal Security Code, ensures that the Minister—a political appointee accountable to Parliament—acts as a firewall. If police misconduct occurs, the Minister faces parliamentary inquiry, shielding the President from direct operational fallout while ensuring the police are subject to civilian bureaucratic oversight.
Similarly, Japan offers a compelling counter-narrative to Indonesia's centralized model. Post-WWII Japan specifically designed its National Police Agency (NPA) to be supervised by the National Public Safety Commission. This commission operates under the Cabinet Office but maintains significant independence to ensure "political neutrality." Unlike Indonesia, which prioritizes command speed, Japan prioritizes insulation from the Prime Minister's political agenda.
Even in the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does not operate as an autonomous body answering solely to the President. It functions under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice (DOJ), led by the Attorney General. This ensures that federal law enforcement is subject to strict legal oversight and budgetary control by Congress—a layer of checks and balances that is visibly absent in Jakarta.
Deconstructing the "Flexibility" Myth
General Sigit’s defense of "flexibility" must be scrutinized. In the era of Digital Humanity, where the police possess sophisticated cyber surveillance tools and "Virtual Police" units, flexibility without oversight is a dangerous proposition.
When a police force controls a massive budget and powerful surveillance technology without ministerial supervision, who watches the watchmen? The current oversight body, Kompolnas, is widely regarded as a "toothless tiger" with only advisory powers. This stands in sharp contrast to the United Kingdom’s Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC), which holds binding investigative powers.
Conclusion: Efficiency Should Not Kill Democracy
Indonesia’s insistence on keeping the police directly under the President is an outlier in the democratic world. While it offers operational speed, it carries the high risk of Authoritarianism by Law.
KunciPro concludes that true police reform is not about how fast the police can move, but how well they can be held accountable when they move in the wrong direction. If the government refuses to place the police under a ministry, then strengthening external audits is non-negotiable. Without it, "flexibility" is merely a euphemism for unchecked power.
Source: This analysis is an English translation of an original op-ed by Tri Lukman Hakim S.H, published on the main journal. [Read Original Article in Indonesian]